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Abstract
This paper studies repeated games with pure strategies and stochastic discounting
under perfect information. We consider infinite repetitions of any finite normal form
game possessing at least one pure Nash action profile. The period interaction realizes
a shock in each period, and the cumulative shocks while not affecting period returns,
determine the probability of the continuation of the game. We require cumulative
shocks to satisfy the following: (1) Markov property; (2) to have a non-negative (across
time) covariance matrix; (3) to have bounded increments (across time) and possess a
denumerable state space with a rich ergodic subset; (4) there are states of the stochastic
process with the resulting stochastic discount factor arbitrarily close to 0, and such
states can be reached with positive (yet possibly arbitrarily small) probability in the
long run. In our study, a player’s discount factor is a mapping from the state space to
(0, 1) satisfying the martingale property.
In this setting, we, not only establish the (subgame perfect) folk theorem, but also
prove the main result of this study: In any equilibrium path, the occurrence of any
finite number of consecutive repetitions of the period Nash action profile, must almost
surely happen within a finite time window. That is, any equilibrium strategy almost
surely contains arbitrary long realizations of consecutive period Nash action profiles.
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1 Introduction
The folk theorems of Aumann and Shapley (1994) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) estab-
lish that payoffs which can be approximated in equilibrium with patient players are equal
the set of individually rational ones. The main reason for this observation is players’ ability
to coordinate their actions using past behavior. In turn, this vast multiplicity of equilibrium
payoffs, considerably weakens the predictive power of game theoretic analysis. Moreover, the
consideration of limited memory and bounded rationality, lack of perfect observability of the
other players’ behavior and the past, and uncertainty of future payoffs do not change this
conclusion, documented by Kalai and Stanford (1988), Sabourian (1998), Barlo, Carmona,
and Sabourian (2009), Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2007); Fudenberg, Levine, and
Maskin (1994), Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2006), Mailath and Olszewski (2008); Dutta (1995),
Fudenberg and Yamamato (2010), and Ho¨rner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2010). An
important aspect of all these findings is the use of constant discounting. The accepted in-
terpretation of the use of discounting in repeated games, offered by Rubinstein (1982) and
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), is that the discount factor determines a player’s probability
of surviving into the next period. Thus, constant discounting implies that this probability
is independent of the history of the game, in particular, invariant.
On the other hand, keeping the same interpretation, but allowing for the discount factor
to depend on the history of the game and/or vary across time, is not extensively analyzed
in the literature on repeated games. Indeed, to our knowledge, the only relevant work in the
study of repeated games is Baye and Jansen (1996) which considers stochastic discounting
with period discounting shocks independent from the history of the game. Related work
concerning stochastic interest rates can be found in the theory of finance, see Ross (1976),
Harrison and Kreps (1979), and Hansen and Richard (1987).
This paper studies repeated games with pure strategies and common stochastic discount-
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ing under perfect information. We consider infinite repetitions of any finite normal form game
possessing at least one pure Nash action profile. The period interaction realizes a shock in
each period, and the cumulative shocks while not affecting period returns, determine the
probability of the continuation of the game. We require cumulative shocks to satisfy the
following: (1) Markov property; (2) to have a non-negative (across time) covariance matrix;
(3) to have bounded increments (across time) and possess a denumerable state space with a
rich ergodic subset; (4) there are states of the stochastic process with the resulting stochastic
discount factor arbitrarily close to 0, and such states can be reached with positive (yet pos-
sibly arbitrarily small) probability in the long run. In our study, a player’s discount factor
is a monotone mapping from the state space to (0, 1) satisfying the martingale property.
In this setting, we, not only establish the (subgame perfect) folk theorem, but also prove
the main result of this study: Under any subgame perfect equilibrium strategy, the occurrence
of any finite number of consecutive repetitions of the period Nash action profile, must almost
surely happen within a finite time window. That is, any equilibrium strategy almost surely
contains arbitrary long realizations of consecutive period Nash action profiles. In other
words, every equilibrium outcome path almost surely involves a stage, i.e. the stochastic
process governing the one–shot discount factor possesses a stopping time, after which long
consecutive repetitions of the period Nash action profile must be observed.
Considering the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with pure strategies and stochastic dis-
counting, our results display that: (1) the subgame perfect folk theorem holds; and, (2) in
any subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for any natural number K, the occurrence of K
consecutive defection action profiles must happen almost surely within a finite time period.
An important implication of our main result concerns social contracts and institutions.
It is well known that in the study of repeated games with patient players social contracts and
institutions, in general, do not create additional equilibrium opportunities to players even
under considerations of limited memory and bounded rationality, lack of perfect observability
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of the other players’ behavior and the past, and uncertainty of future payoffs. Our main
result, on the other hand, implies that no matter what the initial equilibrium arrangement
is, almost surely there will be a period after which the contributions of social contracts and
institutions may be positive.
The fundamental reason of our main result is captured by a significant phrase to be found
on page 101 of Willams (1991): “Whatever always stands a reasonable chance of happening,
will almost surely happen – sooner rather than later.” Indeed, due to the restrictions on
the stochastic processes we prove that for any ε > 0, the one–shot discount factor must
almost surely fall below ε in a finite time period. This result still holds even when the
additional requirement of mean-reversion (in the limit) of the one–shot discount rates is
employed. Then, given any natural number K, the restriction of bounded increments enable
us to identify the level of ε (via the use of K) so that: In any equilibrium path, the one–shot
discount factors cannot exceed a certain threshold even when K + 1 consecutive “good”
shocks are realized. Hence, the occurrence of K consecutive repetitions of the period Nash
action profile, must almost surely happen within a finite time window under any subgame
perfect strategy.
In order to see why the subgame perfect folk theorem holds, first, notice that due to re-
stricting attention to perfect information and stochastic processes with the Markov property,
given any history of shocks, players evaluate future payoffs with their expected discount fac-
tors and the conclusions of Abreu (1988) and Sugaya (2010) apply. 1 Moreover, we show that
the following observation holds regarding players’ expectations for future discount factors:
In any period t with any given history of shocks up to that period, each player evaluates
future returns at least as much as a player using a constant discount factor obtained from
the same shocks. That is, each player’s expectation of the discount factor from period t into
1Given any t and any history of shocks up to period t, the set of subgame perfect continuation payoffs is
compact with players’ expected discount factors obtained from these shocks.
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period τ , τ > t, is not less than the discount factor from t into t + 1 raised to the power
of τ − (t + 1). Hence, one may approximate a given strictly individually rational payoff
vector by constructing a simple strategy profile (supporting that payoff vector via period–0
expectations) involving optimal penal codes to be identified for any given history of shocks.
The literature on stochastic discounting in repeated games is surprisingly not very rich.
A significant contribution in that field is Baye and Jansen (1996). This study considers
a form of stochastic discounting with no stringent restrictions on the values that one–shot
discount factor can take, and, the distribution of one–shot discount factors may depend on
the time index. However, such a distribution in a particular period is independent from
the past distributions. Moreover, they identify two significant cases: The first, when the
one–shot discount factor is realized before the actions in the stage game are undertaken; the
second, when the actions need to be chosen before the one–shot discount factor is realized.
They prove that the folk theorem holds with in the latter case. They also establish that in
the first case, “a full folk theorem is unobtainable... since average payoffs on the efficiency
frontier are unobtainable as Nash equilibrium super–game payoffs”.
Our paper deals with history dependent stochastic discounting, and the situation when
the actions need to be chosen before the one–shot discount factor is realized. That is why, the
results regarding the folk theorem presented in Baye and Jansen (1996), is not in contrast
with ours. It also needs to be emphasized that, while their restrictions on the one–shot
stochastic discount rate are not as strong as ours comparing these distributions across time
periods, ours involve the critical aspect of history dependence. Another important point we
wish to remind the reader of, is that the main message of this study is rather not the folk
theorem.
There is a number of notable contributions in the context of stochastic games. Indeed,
recent studies by Fudenberg and Yamamato (2010) and Ho¨rner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and
Vieille (2010) generalize the folk theorem of Dutta (1995) for irreducible stochastic games
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with the requirement of a finite state space. Our setup can be expressed as an irreducible
stochastic game where the each players’ discounting is constant, yet their payoffs are all
obtained from a (stochastic) scalar, and the actions chosen have no bearing on the future
payoffs. Indeed, ours is a particular irreducible stochastic game with a denumerable state
spaces, hence these folk theorems do not apply.
The organization of the paper is as follows: The next section will present the basic model,
notation and definitions, some preliminary yet important results. In section 3 we present the
main Theorem of this paper, and section 4 contains the folk theorem. Finally, in section 5,
we will present our work solving the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with stochastic discounting.
2 Notations and Definitions
Let G = (N, (Ai, ui)i∈N) be a normal form game with |N |, |Ai| ∈ N for all i ∈ N ; and i’s
payoff function denoted by ui : A → R where A =
∏
i∈N Ai and A−i =
∏
j 6=iAi. We let
Σi = ∆(Ai) where ∆ is the simplex and Σ =
∏
i∈N Σi and Σ−i =
∏
j 6=iΣi. ui : Σ → R
denotes the usual mixed strategy extension of ui. For any i ∈ N denote respectively the
minmax payoff and a minmax profile for player i by vi = minσ−i∈Σ−i maxσi∈Σi ui(σi, σ−i) and
mi ∈ argminσ−i∈Σ−i maxσi∈Σi ui(σi, σ−i).
Let U = {u ∈ co (u(A)) : ui ≥ vi for all i ∈ N} denote the set of individually rational
payoffs and U0 = {u ∈ co(u(A) : ui > vi for all i ∈ N} denote the set of strictly individually
rational payoffs. The game G is full-dimensional if the interior of U in Rn is nonempty.
For what follows, we assume that G has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium:
Assumption 1 There exists a∗ ∈ A with ui(a∗) ≥ ui(ai, a∗−i) for all i ∈ N .
The supergame of G consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of G taking place in
periods t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . . Let N0 = N ∪ {0}.
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In every period t ∈ N0, the probability of the game continuing into the next period is
determined by a random variable Xt. The following Assumption needed, allows for a wide
class of random variables:
Assumption 2 For all t ∈ N0 random variable Xt has a countable non-empty and non-
trivial support in R which is bounded from at least one side, and its expectation exists.
Moreover, X0 = d ∈ R, and Xt d= Xτ for all t, τ ∈ N.
Let X
d
= Xt for all t ∈ N, and Xt ∈ R denote a particular realization of X at time t. The
aggregation of previous shocks will be done as follows:
Assumption 3 {Yt}t∈N is a stochastic process satisfying the following:
1. the Markov property,
2. its transition is governed monotonically by X in a bounded fashion as follows: This
transition is strictly increasing (strictly decreasing) whenever the support ofX is bounded
from below (above); and is either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing if the support
of X is bounded.
3. it has a non-negative covariance matrix across time, whose entries strictly decrease as
the relevant time differences strictly increase.
4. given the state space, S, of {Yt}t∈N, the set of ergodic states, denoted by E, is dense
in S.
Without loss of generality assume that the support of X is bounded above. Then, As-
sumptions 2 and 3 imply that (1)Y0 is deterministic, and in particularY0 = ν¯(d), ν¯ : R→ R
strictly decreasing; and due to the Markov property (2) Yt+1 = ν (Yt,X) where ν : R2 → R
is strictly decreasing and measurable in the σ-algebra where {Yt}t∈N is defined, and bounded
from above; and (3) covariance of Yt and Yτ , τ > t, is greater or equal to 0, and is strictly
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decreasing as τ − t strictly increases; and (4) the set of aperiodic and non-transient states
of {Yt}t∈N must be dense in the state space. Thus, by restricting attention to stochastic
processes with the Markov property, this assumption rules out some interesting situations
such as the following: Given t, let Yt =
∑t
k=0 α
t−kX, α ∈ (0, 1), a formulation in which the
more recent shocks are more important then those that occurred earlier.
Given a stochastic process {Yt}t∈N, let {Ft}t∈N0 denote its natural filtration (i.e. se-
quence of growing σ-algebras); and for any given t ∈ N0, Ft is commonly interpreted as the
information in period t.
Given t, we let a particular realization of the stochastic process {Yt}t∈N be denoted by
Yt ∈ R.
The supergame is defined for a given X0 = d ∈ R, and is denoted by G(d). 2 For
k ≥ 1, a k−stage history is a k-length sequence hk = ((a0, X1), . . . , (ak−1, Xk)), where, for
all 0 ≤ t ≤ k − 1, at ∈ A; and for all 1 ≤ t ≤ k, Xk is realization of X at time k; the space
of all k-length histories is Hk, i.e., Hk = (A× R)k. We use e for the unique 0–stage history
— it is a 0–length history that represents the beginning of the supergame. The set of all
histories is defined by H =
⋃∞
n=0Hn. For every h ∈ H we let `(h) denote the length of h.
For t ≥ 2, we let X t = (X1, . . . , Xt) denote the history of shocks up to and including period
t.
We assume that players have complete information. That is, in period t > 0, knowing
the history up to period t, given by ht, the players make simultaneous moves denoted by
at,i ∈ Ai. The players’ choices in the unique 0–length history e are in A as well. Notice that
in our setting, given t, a player not only observes all the previous action profiles, but also all
the shocks including the ones realized in period t. In other words, the period–t shocks are
commonly observed before making a choice in period t.
2Notice that our formulation is similar to the convention of defining repeated games for a constant and
common discount factor, often denoted by G(δ), where δ ∈ (0, 1) stands for the discount factor.
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For all i ∈ N , a strategy for player i is a function fi : H → Ai mapping histories into
actions. The set of player i’s strategies is denoted by Fi, and F =
∏
i∈N Fi is the joint
strategy space. Finally, a strategy vector is f = (f1, . . . , fn). Given an individual strategy
fi ∈ Fi and a history h ∈ H we denote the individual strategy induced at h by fi|h. This
strategy is defined point-wise on H: (fi|h)(h¯) = fi(h · h¯), for every h¯ ∈ H. We will use (f |h)
to denote (f1|h, . . . , fn|h) for every f ∈ F and h ∈ H. We let Fi(fi) = {fi|h : h ∈ H} and
F (f) = {f |h : h ∈ H}.
A strategy f ∈ F induces an outcome pi(f) as follows: pi0(f) = f(e) ∈ A; and for X1 ∈ R
we have pi1(f)(X1) = f(f(e), X1) ∈ A; and, pi2(f)(X2) = f(f(e), f(f(e), X1), X2) ∈ A,
X1, X2 ∈ R; and continuing in this fashion we obtain
pik(f)(Xk) = f
(
pi0(f), pi1(f)(X1), . . . , pik−1(f)(Xk−1), Xk
) ∈ A, k > 1 and X1, . . . , Xk ∈ R.
2.1 Players’ Payoffs
In this subsection, we wish to present the construction of expected payoffs. Due to that
regard, first we will present our stochastic discounting construction, and second formulate
the resulting expected utilities.
Player i’s discounting is stochastic: The stochastic discount factor of player i is a random
variable, denoted by
{
dt+1t
}
t∈N0 , where for any given t ∈ N0, d
t+1
t identifies the common
probability of the game continuing from period t to period t+ 1.
The particular fashion in which we relate shocks to stochastic discounting is captured in
the following assumption:
Assumption 4 For any i ∈ N , the stochastic discounting process of player i, {dt+1t }t∈N0,
satisfies the following:
1. Given any t ∈ N0, dt+1t = ψ ◦Yt where ψ is a strictly increasing (strictly decreasing)
and continuous function with range given by (0, 1) whenever the support of X is bounded
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above (below). ψ is either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing whenever the support
of X is bounded.
2. {Yt}t∈N0 and ψ are such that {ψ ◦Yt}t∈N0 is a martingale.
3. {Yt}t∈N0 and ψ are such that for any t ∈ N0 and for any ε > 0 there exists τ ≥ t with
Pr (ψ ◦Yτ < ε | Ft) > 0.
For what follows assume without loss of generality that the support of X is bounded
above. Indeed, this situation corresponds to higher shocks to be interpreted as “positive”
with respect to the probability of the continuation of the game, because such shocks will
result in an increase in the current discount factor.
Then, the above assumption involves the following: First, the discount rate is obtained
from the underlying stochastic process determining the cumulative shocks, namely {Yt}t∈N0 ,
by employing a continuous and strictly increasing transformation ψ with range (0, 1). In
fact, this implies that the stochastic process determining the discount rates is bounded.
Moreover, this part of the Assumption also binds the particular timing and information
setting that we employ: Given X0 = d (implying Y0 = ν¯(d), the stochastic discount factor
determining the probability that the game continues into the next period, d10, is pinned down
to a constant ψ(ν¯(d)). In the next period, t = 1, X1 is realized before players decide on
a1 ∈ A. So, Y0 = ν¯(d) and the realization of X1 together determine (via ν¯) a realization of
Y1, hence, δ
2
1 = ψ (ν (ν¯(d), X1)). Thus, following an inductive argument in any period t > 1,
the given X t pins down Yt which in turn determines the particular level of δ
t+1
t , i.e. the
probability that the game continues from period t into period t+ 1.
Therefore, our formulation involves δt+1t being common knowledge among the players in
period t before at is chosen. Thus, apart from the beginning of the game our formulation
corresponds to the case in Baye and Jansen (1996) where “... players choose actions in each
period after having observed the current discount factor”. They show that then the Folk
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Theorem “...breaks down; payoffs on the boundary of the set of individually rational payoffs
are unobtainable as Nash equilibrium average payoffs to the supergame.” However, it is
important to emphasize the following: (1) Their stochastic discounting formulation involves
a common discount factor determined by a random variable distributed independently from
the history of the game; and (2) While our formulation necessitates (due to the use of
stochastic processes) the period 0 discount factor to be deterministic, the failure of the Folk
Theorem shown in the setting of Baye and Jansen (1996) is primarily due to the action
profile chosen in period 0 being a function of the random period 0 discount factor (drawn
before the period 0 action is chosen).
The second part of Assumption 4 requires the stochastic discounting process to be a mar-
tingale. In fact, due to {Yt} satisfying the Markov property (by condition 1 of Assumption
3), now {dt} is a martingale with the Markov property. Moreover, because the uncondi-
tional expectations of ψ ◦Yt, t ∈ N0, are equal to the conditional expectations with respect
to the trivial σ-algebra, F0, the unconditional expectations do not depend on the time index.
This, in turn, implies that E(ψ ◦Yt) = E(ψ ◦Yτ ) = E (ψ ◦Yt|F0) = E (ψ ◦Yτ |F0) for all
t, τ ∈ N0. Thus, the expected value of the discount factor formed at the beginning of the
game, is required to be constant.
Finally, in the third part of Assumption 4 we require that there are states of the stochastic
process with the resulting stochastic discount factor arbitrarily close to 0, and such states
can be reached with positive (yet possibly arbitrarily small) probability in the long run.
An important implication of this Assumption concerns the situation where the common
stochastic discount factor is determined by a stochastic process with a finite state space in
(0, 1). Then, the third part of Assumption 4 cannot hold. 3 Thus, our analysis excludes
3On the other hand, if given a finite state space S ⊂ [0, 1) with Y (s) = 0 for some s and S = (s1, . . . , sK),
K ∈ N, without loss of generality we may assume that Y (sK) ≥ Y (s) for all s ∈ S; thence, the monotonicity
requirement in the second part of Assumption 3 cannot hold. Because, due to the (strict) monotonicity
requirement, there has to be a s′ ∈ S with Y (s′) > Y (sK). Indeed, this implies that S has to be denumerable.
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stochastic processes with finite state spaces.
The stochastic discount factor from period t to period τ , with τ ≥ t, given Fs, s ≤ t, is
defined by dτt =
∏τ−1
s=t d
s+1
s , with the convention that d
t
t = 1. We denote E(d
t+1
t | Fs) for
s ≤ t− 1, by Es
(
dt+1t
)
, which indeed is the projection of dt+1t on Fs. For any t ∈ N0, we let
a realization of dt+1t be denoted by δ
t+1
t , which stands for the realized probability that the
game continues from period t to period t+ 1.
The following Lemma display that the stochastic discounting process constructed in this
study involves weaker discounting than the one associated with constant discounting:
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumptions 2, 3, and 4 are satisfied. Then
1. every possible realization of dτt is in (0, 1) for every τ, t ∈ N0 with τ > t, and the set
of states of {dt+1t }t∈N0 is denumerable,
2. E
(
dt+1t |F0
)
= δ(0) for some δ(0) ∈ (0, 1) and for all t ∈ N0,
3. for every given δˆ ∈ (0, 1), there exists d ∈ R such that δ(0) = δˆ,
4. for every τ, t, s ∈ N0 with τ > t ≥ s, given dt+1t = δt+1t
E
(
dτ+1τ |Ft
)
= δt+1t , (1)
and
E
(
dτt+1|Fs
) ≥ (E (dt+2t+1|Fs))τ−(t+1) . (2)
The implications of this Lemma are essential for the proof, the interpretation and the
evaluation of our results:
The first one displays that the stochastic process specified has a denumerable (countable
but not finite) state space and results in a well-defined construction for stochastic discounting.
This is because,X has a countable support and for every τ, t ∈ N0 with τ > t, dτt =
∏τ−1
s=t d
s+1
s
and every possible realization of ds+1s is in (0, 1) for every s ∈ N0.
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The second shows that date zero expectations of future one–period discount factors are
constant with respect to the time index. And the third, displays that d can be chosen so that
any given constant discount factor can be precisely obtained. The reason is: BothY0 andX0
are deterministic and recall that X0 = d and Y0 = ν¯(d). So, one may select d appropriately
(which in turn pins down ψ by Assumption 4) such that δ(0) = ψ((ν¯(d)) = δˆ. Therefore, we
conclude with respect to date zero expectations the repeated game at hand can be associated
with one having a constant and common discount factor. Thus, our repeated game with
stochastic discounting can be interpreted as a perturbation of a “standard” repeated game
under perfect information with common and constant discount factor (given by δˆ).
Finally, the fourth implication is twofold: Given any history of shocks up to time period
t, the first is that the expected level of future one–period discount factors are equal to the
current one. The second shows that every player values future returns more than a player
using a constant discount factor obtained from the same shocks. That is, a player discounts
a return in period τ , τ > t, with Et (d
τ
t ) which is greater or equal to
(
Et
(
dt+1t
))τ−t
. (Notice
that given X t, Et (d
τ
t ) = δ
t+1
t Et
(
dτt+1
)
, because dt+1t = δ
t+1
t is realized.) In particular, this
implies d can be chosen so that
E0 (d
τ
t ) ≥
(
E0
(
dt+1t
))τ−t
=
(
δ(0)
)τ−t
= δˆτ−t,
and when τ = t + 1 then this inequality holds with an equality. Hence, these properties
establish that with a date 0 point of view our stochastic discounting construction involve
weaker discounting than that associated with a constant and common discount factor δˆ.
The following Remark summarizes these observations:
Remark 1 Suppose that Assumptions 2, 3, and 4 hold. Then, given any repeated game
under perfect information and a common and constant discount factor δˆ ∈ (0, 1), there exists
a repeated game under perfect information and stochastic discounting specified as above which
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satisfies the following properties: (1) The date zero expectations of the one–shot discount
factors are all equal to δˆ; and (2) in date 0 players employ weaker discounting than that
associated with a constant and common discount factor δˆ; and (3) expected level of future
one–period discount factors are equal to the current one.
Proof of Lemma 1. 1, 2 and 3 of the Lemma are straightforward as discussed above.
The first part of the fourth result is, in fact, the martingale identity. For the second part,
notice that due to part 1 of the the fourth result, we can write the conditional expectation
E
(
dτt+1|Ft
)
as
E
(
τ∏
s=t+1
ds+1s |Ft
)
=
τ∏
s=t+1
E
(
ds+1s |Ft
)
+ Στt =
(
E
(
dt+2t+1|Ft
))τ−(t+1)
+ Στt .
The proof concludes because by Assumptions 3 and 4 Στt is non-negative.
The next Assumption is about players’ knowledge of the past when taking expectations:
Assumption 5 In every period t ∈ N0, each player uses the most up to date information,
i.e. Ft.
Given a strategy profile f , because that each period’s supremum return is bounded for
every player, the payoff of player i ∈ N in the supergame G(d) of G is, where ψ(ν¯(d)) = δˆ ∈
(0, 1):
Ui(f) = (1− δˆ)u1
(
pi0(f)
)
+(1− δˆ)E (δ10u1 (pi1(f)(X1))|F0)
+(1− δˆ)E (E (δ20u1 (pi2(f)(X2))|F1)|F0)
+(1− δˆ)E (E (E (δ30u2 (pi3(f)(X3))|F2)|F1)|F0)+ . . . .
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Because that {Fs}s=0,1,,2,... is the natural filtration, the above term reduces to
Ui(f) = (1− δˆ)u1
(
pi0(f)
)
+(1− δˆ)E (δ10u1 (pi1(f)(X1))|F0)
+(1− δˆ)E (δ20u1 (pi2(f)(X2))|F0)
+(1− δˆ)E (δ30u1 (pi3(f)(X3))|F0)+ . . . ,
i.e.
Ui(f) = (1− δˆ)
∞∑
k=0
E
(
δk0u1
(
pik(f)(Xk)
)|F0) , (3)
where pi0(f)(X0) = pi(f(e)), and recall that E (δtt|Fs) = 1 for all s ≤ t. Following a similar
method, we can also define the continuation utility of player i as follows: Given t ∈ N and
X t ∈ Rt
V t,X
t
i (f) = (1− δˆ)
∞∑
k=t
E
(
δkt ui
(
pik(f)(Xk)
)|Ft) , (4)
and for τ > t
V τ,X
t
i (f) = (1− δˆ)
∞∑
k=τ
E
(
δkτui
(
pik(f)(Xk)
)|Ft) . (5)
We use the convention that V 0,X
0
i (f) = Ui(f).
2.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibria
A strategy vector f ∈ F is a Nash equilibrium of the supergame of G if for all i ∈ N ,
Ui(f) ≥ Ui(fˆi, f−i) for all fˆi ∈ Fi. A strategy vector f ∈ F is a subgame perfect equilibrium
of the supergame G(d) if every f¯ ∈ F (f) is a Nash equilibrium.
For any δˆ ∈ (0, 1), let V(δˆ) be the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. Moreover,
V(X t) are the subgame perfect equilibrium continuation payoffs (in period t terms), when
X t is realized. In fact, abusing notation we let V(X t) = V(δt+1t ). Below we will show that
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V(δ) ⊆ U is compact for all δ ∈ (0, 1), hence obtain the following characterization analogous
to Abreu (1988): A strategy f is subgame perfect if and only if for all i ∈ N and for all
t ∈ N0 and for all X t ∈ Rt, we have
V t,X
t
i (f) ≥ (1− δˆ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, pi
t
−i(f)(X
t)) + δt+1t E
(
vi(X
t+1)|Ft
)
, (6)
where δt+1t = d
t+1
t (i.e. given X
t, the realization of dt+1t is equal to δ
t+1
t ), and for every i ∈ N
vi(X
t+1) = min
{
ui : ui ∈ V(δt+2t+1)
}
. (7)
Before the justification of these, we wish to describe the resulting construction briefly.
Notice that, when player i decides whether or not to follow the equilibrium behavior in
period t given the history of shocks X t, it must be that: The player i’s expected continuation
payoff associated with the equilibrium behavior must be as high as player i deviating singly
and optimally today, and being punished tomorrow. An important issue to notice is that,
tomorrow players will know Xt+1 before deciding on their actions. Thus, players will be
punishing player i, the deviator, with the most severe and credible punishment with the
information they have in period t + 1. Thus, the punishment payoff to player i with the
information that players have in period t+ 1, i.e. X t+1, is vi(X
t+1). Player i forecasts these
in period t, and hence, forms an expectation regarding his punishment payoff (starting from
period t+ 1 onwards) with the information that he has in period t, namely X t.
In order to show that for every t and X t V(δt+1t ) is compact, we will be employing
the construction of Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990), and it is important to point out
that their assumptions, 1-5 are all satisfied in our framework: A2, A3, and A4 are trivially
satisfied as the period payoffs are deterministic, and we also impose A1 and A5.
Following their construction, given X t for any W ⊂ RN and the resulting level of
δt+1t ∈ (0, 1), let g(δt+1t ) be the expected discounted, continuation utility level (not including
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today’s payoff levels and using the normalization via δˆ ∈ (0, 1)), for an arbitrary strategy
profile. Furthermore, for that given level of δt+1t , consider the pair, (g(δ
t+1
t ), a) and define
E(g(δt+1t ), a) = δ
t+1
t
(
(1− δˆ)u(a) + g(δt+2t+1)
)
. A pair (g(δt+1t ), a) is called admissible with
respect to W if Ei(g(δ
t+1
t ), a) ≥ Ei
(
g(δt+1t ), (γi, a−i)
)
for all γi ∈ Ai and for all i ∈ N . More-
over, for each set W , define BX
t
(W ) = {E(g(δt+1t ), a)|(g(δt+1t ), a) is admissible w.r.t W}.
Any set that satisfies W ⊂ BXt(W ) is called self-generating at X t. Furthermore recall that
V(δt+1t ) = {V t,Xt(f)|f is a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile}.
Notice that
g(δt+1t ) = (1− δˆ)
∞∑
k=t+1
E
(
δkt u
(
pik(f)(Xk)
)|Ft) ,
for some strategy profile f . Furthermore since, δt+1t is actually realized before the actions
are taken and the multiplicative nature of our discount factor, the above equation becomes
g(δt+1t ) = (1− δˆ)δt+1t
[
u
(
pit+1(f)(X t)
)
+
∞∑
k=t+2
E
(
δkt u
(
pik(f)(Xk)
)|Ft)]
which is equal to
g(δt+1t ) = δ
t+1
t
[
(1− δˆ)u (pit+1(f)(X t))+ g(δt+2t+1)] . (8)
Now, it is easy to see that V(δt+1t ) is self-generating, as the pair, (g(δt+1t ), pit+1(f)(X t)) is
admissible with respect to V(δt+1t ) whenever f is a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy
profile with
V t,X
t
(f) = (1− δˆ)u(at) + g(δt+1t ), (9)
where at = pi
t(f)(X t−1). The two further points to notice is that, due to lemma 1 of
Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990), BX
t
(W ) is compact whenever W is compact, and
the operator BX
t
is monotone. Furthermore, since V(δt+1t ) is bounded (by U), closure of
V(δt+1t ), denoted by cl(V(δt+1t )) is compact. Hence, BXt(cl(V(δt+1t ))) is compact, and due to
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cl(V(δt+1t )) ⊂ BXt(cl(V(δt+1t ))) and self-generation cl(V(δt+1t )) ⊂ V(δt+1t ). Thus, by Theorem
2 of Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990), BX
t
(V(δt+1t )) = V(δt+1t ), thus V(δt+1t ) is compact.
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 hold. Then, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
for all δt+1t ≤ δ every subgame perfect strategy profile f ∈ F is such that f(X t, at) ∈ A is a
Nash equilibrium of G for any t ∈ N0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the subgame perfect strategy f is such
that
(
maxai∈Ai ui(ai, pi
t
−i(f)(X
t))− ui(pit(f)(X t))
)
> 0 for some t ∈ N0 for some X t and
for some i ∈ N . Because otherwise, the strategy is resulting in a repetition of period Nash
behavior. Then, by equation 6, for any such subgame perfect strategy f and i and t and X t
δt+1t
(
V t+1,X
t
i − E
(
vi(X
t+1)|Ft
)) ≥ (1− δˆ)(max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, pi
t
−i(f)(X
t))− ui(pit(f)(X t))
)
.
Both the left and the right hand sides of this inequality are strictly positive. Yet, when the
prescribed action is not a Nash equilibrium of G, then the left hand side converges to 0 when
δt+1t tends to 0, but the right hand side is constant.
3 Inevitability of Nash behavior
In this section, we wish to present the main result of this study:
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 hold. Then for every K ∈ N and for every
δˆ ∈ (0, 1) with δˆ = ψ(ν(d)), there exists T which is almost surely in N0 with Pr (dτ+1τ < δ) = 1
for every τ = T, . . . , T +K.
Using Lemma 2, the above Theorem establishes that in any equilibrium strategy, the
occurrence of any finite number of consecutive repetitions of the period Nash action profile,
must almost surely happen within a finite time window. That is, any equilibrium strategy
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almost surely entails arbitrary long consecutive observations of the period Nash action profile.
In other words, every equilibrium strategy almost surely involves a stage, i.e. the stochastic
process governing the one–shot discount factor possesses a stopping time, after which long
consecutive repetitions of the period Nash action profile must be observed.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let K ∈ N, and δˆ ∈ (0, 1) where δˆ = ψ(ν(d)).
Without loss of generality assume that X has a support bounded from above. Recall
that this situation corresponds to higher shocks to be interpreted as “positive” with respect
to the probability of the continuation of the game, because such shocks will result in an
increase in the current discount factor.
Define supω∈ΩX(ω) = X¯ as the highest realization of X with Ω denoting its space of
events.
Similarly, let Y¯ ∈ {Y ∈ S : ψi(Y ) < δ}, where δ is as given in Lemma 2. Such a Y¯ exists
due to the third part of Assumption 4. It is appropriate to remind the reader that higher
values of Y correspond to higher values of the resulting one–period discount factor.
Now, for any K ∈ N consider the state Y ∗ such that
Y¯ = ν
(
ν
(
. . .
(
ν
(
ν
(
Y ∗, X¯
)
, X¯
)
, X¯
)
. . .
)
, X¯
)
,
where the compounding operation is performed K + 1 times. Due to the third part of
Assumption 4, such a Y ∗ exists.
Finally, define the ergodic state Yˆ ∈ E (recall that E ⊂ S denotes the set of ergodic
states of S) such that Yˆ ∈ {Y ∈ E : Y < Y ∗}. This set is non-empty because of the fourth
part of Assumption 3.
Following Karlin and Taylor (1975), we define the Markovian time
ζ ≡ min{τ ∈ N0 : Yτ ≤ Yˆ }.
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Then by construction, for any k ≤ K it must be that Pr(ψi(Yζ+k) ≥ δ) = 0. Finally due to
ergodicity of Yˆt, ζ is a stopping time, it will almost surely happen in a finite time period,
i.e. Pr(ζ < ∞) = 1. Hence, ζ is in N0 almost surely with Pr
(
dζ+k+1ζ+k < δ
)
= 1 for any
k ≤ K. Indeed, this also implies that ζ is in N0 almost surely with Eτ (δτ+1τ ) < δ for every
τ = ζ, . . . , ζ +K.
4 The Folk Theorem
In this section, we will present a subgame perfect Folk Theorem:
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 hold, and either dim(U) = n or n = 2 and
U0 6= ∅. Then, for all ε > 0, there exists δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) and d ∈ R such that for all u ∈ U0
and δˆ = ψ(ν¯(d)) with δˆ ≥ δ¯, there exists a subgame perfect strategy f of G(d) such that
‖U(f, δˆ)− u‖ < ε.
Proof. Under these assumptions and Lemma 1, due to Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
and Fudenberg and Maskin (1991) we know that for all ε > 0, there exists δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) and
d ∈ R such that for all u ∈ U0 and δˆ ≥ δ¯ with δˆ = ψ(ν¯(d)), there exists a strategy f of G(d)
such that:
V t,X
t
i (f) ≥ (1− δˆ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, pi−i(f)(X t)) + δt+1t E
(
vi(X
t+1)|Ft
)
(10)
when δt+1t that is associated with X
t is greater or equal to δ¯ and because of equation 1
δ10 = δˆ = E
(
δt+1t |F0
)
for all t ∈ N0. Thus, V 0,X0i (f) = U(f, δˆ), and ‖V 0,X
0
i (f)− u‖ < ε.
Hence, the remaining step is to construct the subgame perfect strategy (for states in
which X t have been such that in some period s, s ≤ t, δs+1s < δ¯).
Having established that the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs is compact for any
given δ ∈ (0, 1), we may employ a modification of simple strategies: Following Abreu (1988),
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f ∈ F is a modified simple strategy profile represented by n+2 paths (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n), piNEq)
if f specifies: If the shocks have all been such that the resulting one–period discount factors
were greater or equal to δ¯ then: (i) play pi(0) until some player deviates singly from pi(0); (ii)
for any j ∈ N , play pi(j) if the jth player deviates singly from pi(i), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, where pi(i)
is the ongoing previously specified path; (iii) continue with the ongoing specified path pi(i),
i = 0, 1, . . . , n, if no deviations occur or if two or more players deviate simultaneously; If
the shocks have ever been such that in one of the previous periods the resulting one–period
discount factor was strictly less than δ¯, play piNEq consisting of the repetition of a∗, the
Nash equilibrium pure action profile of the stage game. A profile (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n), piNEq)
of n + 2 outcome paths is subgame perfect if the modified simple strategy represented by it
is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Because of equations 1 and 2, the modified simple strategy defined above is subgame
perfect: For any history in which the shocks have all been such that the resulting one–period
discount factors were greater or equal to δ¯, the above specified modified simple strategy
is a Nash equilibrium due to condition 6; and, for any other history the strategy specified
requires the play of a Nash equilibrium pure action profile for the rest of the game, hence
trivially is a Nash equilibrium in such subgames.
5 An Example: The Prisoners’ Dilemma
The prisoners’ dilemma is described as a normal form game G with two players (N = {1, 2}),
each of whom have two actions: Ai = {C,D} for i = 1, 2. Players’ payoff functions are
described by the following table:
1\2 C D
C 1, 1 −c, b
D b,−c 0, 0
21
where b, c > 0, b > 1, and b < c + 2 making sure that the cooperative payoff (1, 1) is
Pareto optimal and can be obtained only by (C,C). We denote player i’s payoff function
by ui : A → R, for i = 1, 2, and A = A1 × A2. We let U be the set of individually rational
payoffs, i.e. U = {u ∈ con(u(A)) : ui ≥ 0}, and the set of strictly individually rational
payoffs takes the form U0 = {u ∈ con(u(A)) : ui ≥ 0}.
We let X0 = 0, and Xt = X for t > 0 be identically and independently distributed
steps of a standard random walk, i.e. Xt for t > 1 is a random variable that takes values in
{−1, 1} with a probability given by Pr(Xt = −1) = Pr(Xt = 1) = 12 . We interpret Xt = 1 as
a positive (similarly Xt = −1 as a negative) shock at time t. Consequently, Yt =
∑t
s=1Xs
identifies the cumulative shocks up to period t.
By the Axiom of Choice, there exists a strictly increasing and with full support ψ : Z→
(0, 1) ∩Q where Q denotes the set of rational numbers, such that {ψ ◦Yt}t, hence {dt+1t }t,
is a martingale.
Notice that Assumptions 1 and 2 are trivially satisfied. Regarding Assumption 3, the
Markov property clearly holds because the transition of {Yt}t, given by Yt = Yt−1 + Xt,
for t ∈ N. This also shows that its transition is clearly governed by {Xt}t in a monotone
(strictly increasing) fashion. The third part is also satisfied, because the covariance matrix
of {Yt}t is non-negative by Feller (1950), which also shows that the fourth part of this
same Assumption is satisfied since the entire state space of {Yt}t is ergodic. All the parts
of Assumption 4 are satisfied due to the construction described in the previous paragraph.
Finally, we will keep Assumption 5, requiring that every player forms his expectation with
the most up to date σ-algebra.
Because that Assumptions 1 - 5 are satisfied, the characterization of subgame perfection
given in equations 6 and 7 takes the following simple form when attention is restricted to
the prisoners’ dilemma: A strategy f is subgame perfect if and only if for all i = 1, 2 and for
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all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . and for all X t with Xk ∈ {−1, 1} such that 0 ≤ k ≤ t, we have
V t,X
t
i (f) ≥ (1− δˆ) max
ai∈C,D
ui(ai, pi
t
−i(f)(X
t)). (11)
Notice that by Lemma 2, we know that there exists δ > 0 such that for all X t with the
resulting δt+1t < δ, any subgame perfect strategy must recommend the play of (D,D) which
results in a payoff of 0 to both of the players.
For what follows, we will concentrate on obtaining the cooperative payoff exactly under
subgame perfection.
First, we wish to identify the critical level of the discount factor that supports the co-
operative payoff in subgame perfection. Notice that, due to condition 1 and 2, this critical
level of discount factor is different from the one in the constant-discounting case, namely,
b−1
b
. Indeed, in this situation, this critical discount factor, that we call δ?, is less than or
equal to b−1
b
.
Now, fix t ∈ N, and X t with a resulting δt+1t ∈ (0, 1). Then, V t,X
t
i (f) where f is the
simple strategy sustaining the cooperative payoff in subgame perfection and X t is so that
the resulting δt+1t is high enough
(1− δˆ) (1 + Et (δt+1t )+ Et (δt+1t δt+2t+1)+ Et (δt+1t δt+2t+1δt+3t+2)+ . . .)u1(C,C).
Because that for all τ ≥ t, Et
(∏τ−1
k=t δ
k+1
k
)
is continuous in δt+1t , there exists δ
?(t) ∈ (0, 1)
such that
(1− δˆ) (1 + Et (δt+1t )+ Et (δt+1t δt+2t+1)+ Et (δt+1t δt+2t+1δt+3t+2)+ . . .)u1(C,C)− (1− δˆ)b = 0.
This follows from the following: When δt+1t is sufficiently close to 1, the left hand side of the
the above equation is strictly positive. Moreover, when δt+1t is sufficiently close to 0, then the
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left hand side of this equation is strictly negative. Thus, because of the Intermediate Value
Theorem, there exists δ?(t), such that the left hand side is equal to zero. Moreover, because
that {Yt}t has independent and stationary increments we obtain E
(
dτt+1|Fs
)
= E
(
dτ+1t+2 |Fs
)
for all t, τ, s with τ > t ≥ s, which implies δ?(t) = δ?(τ) for all t, τ with t ≤ τ . Hence, we let
δ? = δ?(t) for all t.
Next, we wish to define the simple strategy supporting the cooperative payoff explicitly:
Let pi(0) be given by the repetitions of (C,C), pi(P ) the repetitions of (D,D), and finally
piNEq be also the repetitions of (D,D). Then the simple strategy is: If the shocks have all
been such that the resulting one–period discount factors were greater or equal to δ?, (i) play
(C,C) until some player deviates singly from pi(0) and (ii) play pi(P ) if there was a single
player deviation, and (iii) continue playing pi(j), j = 0, P if there were either no deviations or
multi-player deviations; and if there is a period in which the resulting one–period discount
factors were strictly less than δ? play piNEq, repetitions of (D,D), for the rest of the game.
Due to equations 1 and 2, the above strategy f is such that V 0,X
0
i (f) = 1 for all i
whenever δ10 = δˆ ≥ δ?. Moreover, it easily can be seen that f is subgame perfect.
But, by Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, we know that in any subgame perfect equilibrium
strategy f , for every K ∈ N and for every δˆ ∈ (0, 1) with δˆ = δ10, there exists T which
is almost surely in N0 and the period behavior prescribed by f must be (D,D) for every
τ = T, . . . , T +K.
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